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Abstract
We investigate the determinants of the education gender gap in Italy in a historical
perspective with a focus on the influence of family structure. We capture the latter with
two indicators: residential habits (nuclear versus complex families) and inheritance rules
(partition versus primogeniture). After controlling for economic, institutional, religious, and
cultural factors, we find that over the 1861–1901 period family structure is a driver of the
education gender gap, with a higher female-to-male enrollment rate ratio in upper primary
schools being associated with nuclear residential habits and equal partition of inheritance.
We also find that only the effect of inheritance rules persists over the 1971–2001 period.
(JEL codes: E02, H75, I25, J16, N33, O15).
Keywords: education gender gap, Italian unification, family types, inheritance, institu-
tions, religion, convergence
1 Introduction
Over a century and a half after the unification of the country in 1861, in
Italy the education gender gap has been gradually closing, and even revers-
ing in recent years. This article investigates its determinants by exploring
the comparative effect of economic, institutional, religious, and cultural
factors in historical perspective. The main focus of our investigation is
the potential influence of family structure on gendered human capital
accumulation. Despite the fact that Italy—within cross-country investiga-
tions—is often treated as homogeneous in this respect, in fact, it does
exhibit significant variations in its family structure along several
dimensions.
The industrialization process that took place in the 1950s and 1960s has
profoundly affected the Italian family structure by provoking a shift of
residential habits toward the nuclear model. However, the nuclear model,
as opposed to more complex ones, was already diffused even during the
19th century, especially in the South. Likewise, partible inheritance rules
have long dominated a large portion of the peninsula. At the same time,
however, a patriarchal and authoritarian attitude was also prevalent
within Italian families, according to a rigid hierarchy that emphasized
gender roles (Barbagli 1987). Despite the fact that family structure, in
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Italy and elsewhere, not only went through a time evolution but also
responded to different rules in rural versus urban contexts and also
across different social classes, it was possible to identify a relatively
stable geographical differentiation of family models by the time the coun-
try was unified.
To classify family structure, we monitor two specific dimensions, reflect-
ing residential habits and rules of inheritance, respectively. Therefore, we
distinguish between nuclear versus complex residential habits and between
equal partition versus primogeniture. Our hypothesis is that both dimen-
sions may have influenced the position of women within the family and in
society, leading through the centuries to a shift in cultural values and
beliefs that might have persistently changed the status of women, and in
particular their ability to acquire human capital.
Nuclear residential habits reflect a more liberal, rather than authoritar-
ian, attitude. In a context where authority is largely a monopoly of males,
we conjecture that a more liberal family structure should favor a more
advantageous position of women. Partible inheritance is associated with
more equality among children including females, if compared with alter-
native customs such as male primogeniture or discretion, which typically
favor male heirs. In turn, augmented property rights should be associated
with a broader set of rights, including access to education. We also evalu-
ate the potential additional role of female age at marriage, since age at
marriage is another important indicator of the degree of subordination of
women with respect to men and therefore of gender inequality. Low age at
marriage for women is in fact associated with inequality between the sexes
and different tasks and responsibilities. Moreover, we combine these three
indicators—residential habits, inheritance rules, and female age at mar-
riage—to obtain an extended version, adapted to Italy, of the classification
of family structure due to Todd (1990). While Todd (1990) only considers
residential habits and inheritance rules, we also evaluate the combined
potential role of female age at marriage, following the attention paid by
Hajnal (1965, 1982), and by Barbagli (1987) and Del Panta et al. (1996)
with specific focus on Italy, to this additional dimension.
Our analysis of the effect of family structure on the education gender
gap is based on a comprehensive newly assembled database reporting
primary school enrollment, by gender, across 69 provinces over a
20-year subsample covering the 1861–1901 period, which captures the cru-
cial initial 40 years of the country. At this critical juncture for the history
of the country, we still observe a sizeable gender gap even in compulsory
primary school. We complete our database with information on relative
contemporaneous schooling attainment, with a focus on higher levels such
as secondary and tertiary schools, where a gender gap is still likely to
linger on in the present days. Besides family structures, among the
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correlates we explore are indicators for economic, institutional, and reli-
gious factors. During this period, Italy indeed represents a microcosm
which exhibits rich variations along all these dimensions. As a result, we
present evidence that family structure is a robust correlate of the education
gender gap during the historical period under examination, with a higher
female-to-male ratio in enrollment in primary school being associated with
nuclear residential habits and with equal partition of inheritance.
Moreover, we find that the impact of family structure is persistent but,
over a contemporaneous dataset covering the years 1971 and 2001, only
the latter dimension still matters. However, despite the fact that our results
are consistent across different specifications and after controlling for a
large set of potentially confounding factors, we should still be cautious
in interpreting our results as causal, since we still lack an underlying the-
oretical model of the effect of family structure on the education gender
gap.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summar-
ize the relevant literature. In Section 3, we present our newly collected
dataset. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis on the historical educa-
tion gender gap. In Section 5, we turn to the contemporaneous education
gender gap. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature
The literature on girls’ education in historical perspective has looked at
multiple angles across time and space. Goldin (1998) and Goldin et al.
(2006) study the evolution of secondary and tertiary education, respect-
ively, for American women during the 20th century.1 Becker and
Wo¨ßmann (2008) investigate the determinants of girls’ education over
19th-century data for Prussia, with a focus on the positive influence of
Protestantism.2 The education gender gap in Italy during the 19th century
is studied by Bertocchi and Bozzano (2013), who search for their deep,
long-term determinants and find a beneficial influence on women’s out-
comes of the medieval pattern of commerce, along the routes that con-
nected Italian cities among themselves and with the rest of the world.3 In a
more general setting, the long-term determinants of the gender gap have
been studied by Galor and Weil (1996), who model the link between
1 Fernandez and Wong (2011) analyze the recent disappearance of the education gender
gap in the USA.
2 Protestantism was nearly absent in Italy throughout the period under examination.
3 For Italy, see also Bertocchi et al. (2014), who document a reversal of the education
gender gap in the post-World War II period, and Bozzano (2014), who adapts the
Global Gender Gap Index to contemporaneous Italian data.
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women’s inferior physical strength and their potential accumulation of
human capital, and Alesina et al. (2013), who test the hypothesis that
cultivation techniques requiring the plough determined the historical
gender division of labor,4 while Becker and Barro (1988) analyze the
trade-off between the quantity and quality of children, the latter depend-
ing on the children’s human capital. With respect to this literature, our
contribution is to focus on the influence of family culture on the education
gender gap.5
We shall present below four streams of the literature on gender roles,
focusing, respectively, on the role of the family, which is our main focus,
as well as the influence of development, institutions, and religion as poten-
tial determinants.
2.1 Gender and family structure
The potential role for family structure in determining women’s position
has attracted a growing literature, following seminal work by Banfield
(1958), Coleman (1990), and Todd (1990) on the general relevance of
family ties for socioeconomic outcomes.
Todd (1990) develops a classification of family types organized along
two leading axes. The first axis focuses on the relationship between parents
and children, which can be captured by residential habits. On this basis,
families can be classified as ‘liberal’, that is, nuclear families where chil-
dren leave after marriage, or ‘authoritarian’, that is, extended (stem, or
communitarian) families where different generations live together. The
second axis focuses on the relationship between siblings, which in turn
can be captured by inheritance rules. The latter can be differentiated into
‘equal’ and ‘unequal’ ways to distribute family’s wealth, where inequality
may involve primogeniture, unigeniture, or the absence of formal rules.6
The combination of the above two axes leads to the following four
family types: the absolute nuclear family, ‘liberal’ and ‘unequal’ (since
no formal inheritance rules apply); the egalitarian nuclear family, ‘liberal’
and ‘equal’; the stem family, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘unequal’; and the com-
munitarian family, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘equal’. Todd also acknowledges
the presence of a fifth type, the incomplete stem family, particularly wide-
spread at the border between different national entities, which combines
the ‘authoritarian’ model with inheritance customs which are de jure but
not de facto egalitarian. To determine the distribution of these family
types within Western Europe, Todd applies the ‘regressive method’ due
4 The plough system applied to the entire territory of Italy.
5 See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) for a broad survey of the literature studying the
long-term impact of cultural traits on a range of economic outcomes.
6 See Bertocchi (2006) on the historical evolution of inheritance practices.
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to Bloch (1949), which consists in starting with the most recent and com-
plete data and from those to go back to historical and more fragmented
data. In fact, it is from the patterns documented for the 1950s and 1960s
on the basis of censuses that he can establish strong persistence of the
observed family types back to the Middle Age.
The Todd (1990) classification has been applied to the analysis of a
number of issues.7 More relevant to this article are those related to
women’s position. Duranton et al. (2009) find that the European regions
where egalitarian—rather than absolute—nuclear families tended to pre-
dominate have lower female participation in the labor force. Dilli et al.
(2013) apply Todd’s classification to account for non-European parts of
the world and find that it affects gender equality index. Tur-Prats (2014)
applies it to an analysis of domestic violence in Spain. An alternative
measure of family structure is introduced by Alesina and Giuliano
(2010, 2014), who construct a subjective variable measuring the strength
of family ties using survey data and show that strong family ties are posi-
tively correlated with lower female labor force participation and more
traditional attitudes toward women. Galasso and Profeta (2010) compare
Todd’s classification with the one proposed by Alesina and Giuliano
(2010, 2014) and find that they are broadly consistent.
While the classification of family types proposed by Todd (1990) is the
one which is more commonly applied to economic analysis, in a previous
volume, Todd (1984) suggests a different classification that replaces the
second axis based on inheritance rules with an alternative one, focused on
the relationship between husband and wife and therefore more specifically
directed to the analysis of the role of women.8 The anthropological cat-
egorization of the husband–wife axis is based on the degree of feminism,
which is maximum under matrilinearity, minimum under patrilinearity,
and intermediate under bilaterality. The anthropological definition of
this set of terms is based on kinship. For instance, a family system is
considered matrilinear if it confers a prominent role in social life on the
7 Galasso and Profeta (2010, 2013) apply Todd’s classification to the analysis of European
pension systems and redistributive policies. Greif and Tabellini (2012) distinguish between
extended and nuclear families to investigate the development patterns of China vs.
Europe.
8 The reason why inheritance rules are discarded by Todd (1984) when the focus is on
equality between sexes is that he claims that equal partition of inheritance was in fact only
applied to sons, thus excluding daughters and implying a lower status for women.
However, the exclusion of women from inheritance was not the rule. For instance,
Goody (1976) reports that between 1200 and 1800 in European societies property was
largely transmitted both to men and women. More specifically in parts of Italy, for
example, under the Habsburgs, the legal right to property had been granted to women
since the beginning of the Restoration era (Licini 2011).
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kin of the wife. Todd (1984) assigns to the resulting six family types dif-
ferent potentials in terms of development and expansion of mass literacy
and also highlights a strong association between literacy and another
family characteristic, female age at marriage. The gender gap in literacy,
however, is not considered.
Previous research by Hajnal (1965, 1982) had focused on the
European Marriage Pattern (EMP), a family model diffused in
Northern Europe at least since the 16th century which involves nuclear
residential patterns associated with late marriage for both sexes.
According to Hajnal, these two features are closely connected: marriage
can occur at an early age only in the presence of complex rather than
nuclear families, since economic constraints would not allow the forma-
tion of an independent family at an early age. The pattern prevailing in
Southern Europe, again according to Hajnal, was instead characterized by
early marriage and complex families. The EMP has been associated with
women’s position by De Moor and Van Zanden (2010), who argue that
the practice of consensual marriage implied by this model led to distinctive
cultural values based on equality between the sexes. This in turn encour-
aged women to work outside the household, contributing to economic
growth. Along similar lines, Foreman-Peck (2011) emphasizes the impli-
cations of the higher marriage age for human capital investment for both
sexes, but particularly for women, while Voigtlander and Voth (2013)
model and test the hypothesis that the Black Death triggered the shift
toward the EMP by improving female employment prospects in the pas-
toral sector.
However, subsequent research has demonstrated that the nexus sug-
gested by Hajnal between nuclear living arrangements and late marriage
is not robust. Todd (1990) questions the association between coresidence
and late marriage. Indeed, Southern Europe witnessed both early mar-
riage, particularly for women, within nuclear families as well as late mar-
riage within complex ones. Barbagli (1987) and Del Panta et al. (1996)
show that examples of the former and the latter combination were diffused
in Southern and Central Italy, respectively.9
This article contributes to the literature on family structure and
women’s outcomes by applying Todd’s and Hajnal’s analysis to the case
of Italy and by highlighting the separate roles of residential habits, inher-
itance rules, and age at marriage in this specific context.
9 Dennison and Ogilvie (2013)’s meta-study confirms that the European Marriage Pattern
did not prevail throughout Europe and that its key components did not always coincide; it
also casts doubts on the association between this family model and women’s empower-
ment, human capital accumulation, and economic success.
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2.2 Gender and development
Turning to the other potential correlates of the gender gap, the litera-
ture recently surveyed by Duflo (2012) looks at its nexus with develop-
ment. With reference to the education dimension, the author argues that,
even though the gender gap in primary and secondary enrollment has
rapidly gone down during the past decades, it still remains wider in
poor countries. This evidence suggests that economic growth can have
an important positive impact on gender equality but at the same time
that it is generally not sufficient to overcome discrimination. The analysis
in this article confirms that economic factors indeed have a limited impact
on gender equality in education, which justifies our focus on alternative
explanations.
2.3 Gender, institutions, and educational policies
Gender outcomes can also be influenced by a wide array of institutions,
starting from the institutions that can shape the school system. In the
Italian context, the influence of the preunification political regimes on
educational policies, including their gendered dimension, has been recog-
nized by the history literature. Female education was largely neglected
(Serristori 1842) in most areas, with the exception of Lombardy, Rome,
and the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza (Vigo 1971). In many cases, not
only the quantity but also the quality of education for girls was inferior,
being concerned primarily with knitting and sewing (Incatasciato 1978). In
the Bourbons’ territories, the law explicitly allowed the hiring of illiterate
female teachers (De Mauro 1963). Unification brought the introduction of
compulsory primary education for boys and girls and, despite the resili-
ence up to the present day of a North–South divide, activated a regional
convergence process in educational attainment, as well as the gradual
reduction of the gender gap which is the focus of the present article. We
refer to Bertocchi and Spagat (1997), Zamagni (2002), A’Hearn et al.
(2011), and Bertola and Sestito (2013) for an exhaustive description of
the evolution of the educational system in Italy.
2.4 Gender and religion
Finally, the influence of religion on gender roles has been explored by
Algan and Cahuc (2006) who, using survey data, show that Catholics,
Orthodoxs, and Muslims are more prone to embrace the traditional
male breadwinner conception than Protestants and atheists. Within the
sociology literature, Esping-Andersen (1990) also associates a conservative
view of women and the family with Catholic countries, while Bertocchi
(2011) shows that Catholicism is negatively associated with the introduc-
tion of women suffrage in the 1870–1930 period. In this article, we aim at
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disentangling a potential role of religion even within a homogeneously
Catholic country.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To study the long-term determinants of the education gender gap, we com-
pile a database on education outcomes in late 19th-century Italy drawing
from various sources. The main source is represented by data collected by
the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (MAIC). Our
data cover 69 Italian provinces (at 1871 boundaries) in three points in time
(1861, 1881, and 1901), spanning the initial 40 years of the unified Kingdom
of Italy. It should be stressed that enrollment data at the provincial level are
only available until 1901. Data collection at this level of disaggregation is
resumed only after World War II. For the same geographical entities, we
complete the dataset with contemporaneous (1971 and 2001) census data on
education outcomes by gender, taken from Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
(ISTAT 2009). We also collect data on the potential determinants of the
historical and contemporaneous education gender gap. The variables are
described below. We refer to the methodological notes in the Appendix for
further details. Below, we also illustrate descriptive statistics and stylized
facts that can suggest preliminary hypotheses and considerations.
3.1 Education
At unification in 1861, the Kingdom of Italy immediately implemented
national educational policies primarily aimed at removing regional dispa-
rities across regions. In 1859, even before Rome became the capital, the
Casati law disciplined the school system by imposing free and compulsory
primary education for boys and girls, starting at age 6 years. The law
introduced an initial compulsory 2-year lower primary school (extended
to 3 years in 1877 by the Coppino law) followed by a subsequent non-
compulsory 2-year upper primary level. The presence of free schools for
boys and girls was made mandatory for the local authorities, in the effort
to erase the regional differences inherited from the pre-unitary polities and
the differential supply and quality of primary schools. However, these
legal provisions were enforced only slowly and unevenly, so that spatial
disparities are still present throughout the historical period under exam-
ination even though ultimately, by the end of the 19th century, these
policies proved effective and contributed to a substantial decline, together
with a regional convergence, of the gender gap in education.10
10 For further details see the references in Subsection 2.3.
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For our dependent variables, we collect historical enrollment rates by
gender for total population of primary school age, which consists of the
population between 6 and 12 (excluded) years of age. On this basis, we
calculate a measure of gender equality given by the female-to-male ratio in
enrollment rates in primary school11 for the years 1861, 1881, and 1901.
We also compute a separate measure at the lower and upper primary
school level, only the former being compulsory.12 Beside data by gender,
we also include general indicators of schooling defined as the number of
pupils enrolled in primary school over the number of children of the cor-
responding 6–12 school age. Again we disaggregate this measure into a
lower and an upper primary school level.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table A2 reveal that in the 1861–
1901 period, the average enrollment rate in primary schools is 52.7%13 and
the average female-to-male enrollment ratio is 0.83 (where 1 represents
perfect equality). However, there exists significant variation across prov-
inces for both outcomes, ranging from 9.7 to 117.3% for the enrollment
rate14 and from 0.05 to 1.51 for the female-to-male enrollment ratio.15
Moreover, the picture changes considerably if one distinguishes between
the lower and upper primary level: the former displays a female-to-male
enrollment ratio of 0.85; for the latter, the corresponding figure is 0.55.
Further inspection of our data reveals that, both at the lower and upper
level, enrollment rates increase gradually over the years in the sample. For
each year in the sample, gender disparity as captured by the female-to-
male enrollment ratio is more pronounced at the upper level. Over time,
we observe a gradual closing of the gender gap. Nevertheless, at the end of
the period under analysis differences between boys and girls are far from
eradicated and remain especially deep at the upper level. In the following
discussion, we focus on the female-to-male enrollment ratio at the upper
primary level, where gender differences are more pronounced and more
persistent.
The maps in Figure 1 show the female-to-male ratio of the enrollment
rates at the upper primary level, organized by qurtiles, by province and
over time. The darker is the shade of the provincial surface, the larger
11 This measure is equivalent to the UN definition of the Gender Parity Index, where 0
corresponds to extreme inequality and 1 to full equality.
12 Because of lack of data at the provincial level, the denominators of the enrollment rates
at the upper and lower levels are always the corresponding 6–12 population figures.
13 Even though schooling was formally mandatory at the lower level, de facto the imple-
mentation of the law was gradual and patchy.
14 The reason why enrollment rates can be greater than 100% is the presence of under-aged
and/or overaged enrollment. See the methodological notes in the Appendix for details.
15 For some observations the ratio is larger than 1, which indicates a gender gap in favor of
females.
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the female-to-male ratio and therefore the higher gender equality.
The maps confirm both the time trend and the differentiation across
provinces.
Turning to the period following World War II, our measures of educa-
tion gender equality focuses on the secondary and tertiary levels, since
over this sample equality is a well-established fact at the primary level.
Rather than to enrollment, these data refer to the number of females
and males holding high school and college degrees, respectively.16
We take census data for the earliest and latest years currently available,
that is, 1971 and 2001. From this perspective, we can evaluate the
influence of a wave of educational reforms implemented in the 1960s
as well as of the increase of mandatory education to 12 years
introduced in 2000.17 Taking an initial glance at contemporary data,
we find that as of 1971, the position of females both at the secondary
and the tertiary level is far from equal from that of males, especially at
the tertiary level. The picture changes sensibly by 2001, with a near-closing
of the gap at both levels, and in fact almost perfect equality at the
tertiary level.
Figure 1 Female-to-male ratio upper primary enrollment rate, 1861–1901.
The darker the shade, the higher is the female-to-male ratio upper enrollment
rate in the province. Provinces are identified by abbreviations of current provin-
cial names. See the Appendix for sources.
16 Flow data about enrollment are not available at the provincial level.
17 For a description of the evolution of the education system in Italy see the references listed
in Subsection 2.3.
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In the following discussion, we relate our measure of gender equality in
education to the potential determinants previously described. More details
on the definitions and sources of all variables, as well as on methodo-
logical issues, can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Family structure
Our primary indicators for family structure reflect, separately, each of the
two axes defined by Todd (1990), that is, residential habits and rules of
inheritance. Accordingly, we first define a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if the nuclear family pattern was prevailing in the province and
0 otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
partible inheritance was prevailing and 0 otherwise. We follow Duranton
et al. (2009) for the matching between the information in Todd and geo-
graphic units.
As mentioned in subsection 2.1, Todd (1984) defines a third axis con-
cerning the degree of feminism. However, under this classification, Italy
belongs entirely to the bilateral type, so that we cannot exploit any vari-
ation across provinces.
To account for female age at marriage, building on Hajnal (1982) and
Todd (1984), we also collect data from Barbagli (1987) on the percentage
of women married below the age of 15 years in 1872–1875. The original
source is Direzione di Statistica (DIRSTAT 1877). However, information
is available only at the regional level. In this respect, we extend what was
already documented by Todd (1984) who, within an international com-
parison, for year 1840 placed all of Italy with the low-age (namely, below
27 years of age) area. As explained by Barbagli (1987), low age at marriage
for women is an important indicator of subordination and inferiority of
women within the family, since it is associated with inequality between the
sexes and different tasks and responsibilities.18
Alternatively, we also account from the Todd (1990) four-way classifi-
cation (again matched to provincial units following Duranton et al. 2009).
However, only three of the Todd family types are relevant for Italy, since
the absolute nuclear family is never represented. Moreover, the stem
family only appears in its incomplete form, in the area bordering the
Austrian Empire. Furthermore, following Hajnal (1982), Todd (1984),
Barbagli (1987), and Del Panta et al. (1996), we augment the Todd
18 At least up to unification, no association can be found between late marriage and edu-
cation acquisition. In fact, in areas where late marriage applies, we find a very high
proportion of the population (up to one-third for females in Northern Italy) spending
at least some years as domestic servants (Barbagli 1987). This pattern was motivated by
the necessity to accumulate sufficient means to start a family and was common to other
European countries (Hajnal 1967, 1972).
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(1990) classification to distinguish for Italy between two different models
of egalitarian nuclear family, which are, respectively, associated with late
and early marriage age for women. As a result, we obtain for Italy four
family types, generating a set of four dummies: egalitarian nuclear with
late marriage, incomplete stem, communitarian, and egalitarian nuclear
with early marriage.
Table A2 reveals that the nuclear family model prevails in about 53% of
the provinces, while partible inheritance does so in about 87%. On aver-
age, women marry before age 15 years in only 3% of the regions, even
though the figure is as high as 13% in the case of Sicily.
Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of the provinces where
nuclear families and equal partition prevail, as well the geographic distri-
bution of the four family types based on our adaptation of the Todd
(1990) classification. While for equal partition we observe a strong geo-
graphical pattern, with primogeniture being concentrated in an area which
is close, even though not coincident, with the current North East, the
picture is more varied for the coresidence dimension and for the combined
family types. Overall, in an international comparison, Italy exhibits rich
variation along these dimensions. Indeed, Spain, for instance, exhibits
only two family types: the stem family, totally concentrated in the
North, and the egalitarian nuclear family in the South. Likewise,
England only presents the egalitarian nuclear family in the East and the
incomplete stem in the West. To be noticed also is the fact that both in
Spain and England the two axes perfectly overlap, so that it is not possible
to disentangle the potential effect of coresidence from that of inheritance
rules.
3.3 Economic development
Our historical correlates for economic development involve measures of
the level of wealth and the degree of structural transformation, both with a
panel dimension over the 1861–1901 period. We proxy the former with the
average height of conscripts aged 20 years. Data on average height for the
three waves are taken from A’Hearn et al. (2009). Height is the main
indicator employed in the economic history literature because it provides
researchers with a measure of the stock of nutritional investment and
therefore important indirect information on changes in the well-being of
populations (Fogel et al. 1982; A’Hearn et al. 2011). Since the available
data neglect female stature, whose trend does not necessarily mimic that of
males, as an alternative proxy of wealth we also consider population dens-
ity data (from the census) and estimates of per capita value added due to
Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne (2011). To proxy for structural transform-
ation, we employ an index of industrialization computed by Ciccarelli and
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Fenoaltea (2013) and defined as the share of value added in manufacturing
(excluding construction) over the share of the male population over age 15
years (data are from census).
Table A2 shows that the national average height, our proxy for
prosperity, is about 163 cm. In Figure 3, we present the geographic
distribution by quartiles of height in the 1861–1901 period. Again, the
darker is the shade of the provincial surface, the higher is average
provincial height. Over the 40 years, height tends to increase but at
different speeds, leaving large territorial differences at the end of the
period.
We measure contemporaneous development using per capita GDP
(Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne 2011) in 1971 and 2001.
3.4 Political regimes
The period immediately preceding unification, often referred to as
Risorgimento, runs from the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815 until
1871 (when Rome becomes the capital). Before this historical turning
point, Italy was divided among four main dynasties: the Savoys, ruling
roughly in the North West, that is, in Piedmont, Liguria, and Sardinia;
the Habsburgs, holding direct control over the Lombardy–Venetia, mostly
located in today’s North East, as part of the Austrian Empire, as well as
indirect control over the Granduchy of Tuscany and other minor Duchies
nearby; the Pope, reigning over Rome and the Center South; and the
Bourbons, in charge of the South and the Duchy of Lucca. To control
Nuclear vs. extended family 
structure 
Equal vs. unequal partition of 
inheritance 
Family types 
  Egalitarian  with early marriage 
  Communitarian  
  Egalitarian  with delayed marriage
  Incomplete stem 
    
Nuclear family
   
Partible 
inheritance
Figure 2 Family structure.
Provinces are identified by abbreviations of current provincial names. See the
Appendix for sources.
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for the legacy of deeply rooted political institutions that may have sha-
ped educational policies and the evolution and persistence of gender dis-
parities, we construct a set of four dummies for the prevailing political
regimes the 1815–1861 period, that is, Savoys, Habsburgs, Pope, and
Bourbons.
Figure 4 illustrates the political geography of Italy according to our
classification. In the provinces previously belonging to the Kingdom of
Sardinia and in Lombardy–Venetia, we observe larger female-to-male
ratios. At the opposite, we find the Bourbons’ territories, largely located
in the South. These discrepancies can be explained, at least in part, by
educational policies. For instance, schooling was compulsory until age 12
years in Lombardy–Venetia. As previously mentioned, the political unifi-
cation of the country implied the adoption and implementation of
national educational policies.
For the analysis of contemporaneous data we refer to four current
macro-regions (North West, North East, Center, and South), which par-
tially overlap with the historical political regimes but better capture the
postwar spatial distribution of policies and institutions.
3.5 Religion
While Italy has been historically a homogeneously Catholic country, we
still aim at exploring the potential role of religion through various meas-
ures of the presence of the Church. Our first measure is the distance from
109118811681
  158.1 - 161.7 
  161.8 - 163.4 
  163.5 - 164.9 
  165 - 167.4 
Figure 3 Average height of conscripts, 1861–1901.
The darker the shade the higher is average height of conscripts in each year.
Provinces are identified by abbreviations of current provincial names. See the
Appendix for sources.
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Rome of the main city or town of each province.19 Second, we collect
information from Bianchi (1845) and Palmieri (1857) about the number
of parish churches in each province before Italy’s unification and con-
struct their density by dividing it by the provincial surface. Since the cre-
ation of parish churches is historically determined and does not necessarily
reflect the intensity of the influence of religion around unification, we also
rely on two additional indicators. Our third indicator is the fraction of
Catholic (as opposed to secular) teachers over the total number of teachers
in 1862 (fromMAIC 1865 and 1874). To be noticed is that other cults were
nearly absent in Italy throughout the period under examination.
Our fourth indicator measures the presence of the clergy using the
number of priests (taken from Amati 1860, and Correnti 1858) over popu-
lation in 1857, even though we have this information only at the regional
level.
Table A2 shows that the density of parish churches is on average 13 per
squared kilometer, over a range of 1–70. It is highest in Sicily and some
other southern provinces. The proportion of Catholic teachers is on aver-
age almost 36% of total teachers, ranging from 2 to 85.3%, and is larger in
the North and in Sardinia. In Figure 5 we illustrate two of the variables
reflecting the influence of religion.
3.6 Geography
To capture residual factors such as the presence of different factor endow-
ment, we also collect data on latitude, longitude, and the provincial frac-
tion of plain terrain. Summary statistics are reported in Table A2.
  Bourbons 
  Pope 
  Absburgs 
  Savoys 
Figure 4 Preunification political regimes.
Provinces are identified by abbreviations of current provincial names. See the
Appendix for sources.
19 Becker and Wo¨ßmann (2009) employ distance from Wittenberg, Luther’s city, to meas-
ure the influence of Protestantism in late nineteenth century Prussia.
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4 The Historical Education Gender Gap
In Table 1, we start with a set of Ordinary Least-Square regressions (with
clusters at the provincial level) where the dependent variable is the female-
to-male ratio in enrollment rates20 at the upper non-compulsory primary
level in the 1861–1901 period. To be recalled is that our dependent variable
should be interpreted as an index of gender equality in education, so that a
positive coefficient indicates that the corresponding regressor is associated
with more gender equality and thus a smaller gender gap. In the first
column, we assess the effects of economic correlates by entering as regres-
sors, beside time dummies, the 1861–1901 levels of height and industrial-
ization, as proxies of prosperity and structural transformation: their
coefficients are both significant and positive, which suggests that economic
progress and modernization may indeed be associated with a more favor-
able position for women in the educational sphere. The (unreported) time
dummies also display highly significant and positive coefficients.
In the next columns, we add different sets of regressors, capturing pol-
itical, religious, and cultural factors. Initially we add one set at a time. In
Column 2, we introduce our main indicators for family structure, that is,
the dummy for nuclear families and the dummy for partition of inherit-
ance. The former is associated with a more liberal family structure, as
opposed to the authoritarian model, which in turn should favor a more
advantageous position of women within the family and in society. The
latter is associated with more equality among children including females, if
compared to alternative customs such as male primogeniture, or discre-
tion, which typically favor male heirs. As suggested by intuition, both
indicators are positive and significant.
In Column 3, we insert the set of dummies accounting for the political
regimes prevailing before unification. The reference is the Savoy dynasty
which until 1861 ruled, roughly, the North West but then took charge of
the unified Kingdom of Italy. All the coefficients are negative, suggesting
worse performances for the other regimes, even though only the coefficient
for the Bourbons is significant, which signals that a deep divide exists from
the start between the South and the rest of the country. To be noticed is
that controlling for the preunification political regimes means introducing
regional fixed effect which non-surprisingly reduce considerably the sig-
nificance of the economic correlates.
In Columns 4–7, we control for different indicators for religion. The
impact of the influence of the Catholic Church is a priori ambiguous. On
the one hand, Catholicism is associated with a more traditional role of
20 Enrollment rates are measured as the number of pupils of each gender over the school
age (i.e., 6–12 years of age) population of the corresponding gender.
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women, which implies a lesser need for them to work and to acquire
human capital through education. On the other hand, in the period
under examination, education for boys and girls was frequently provided
by religious institutions. We capture these factors with four variables: the
density of parish churches, distance from Rome, the number of the mem-
bers of the clergy over population, and the proportion of Catholic tea-
chers. However, when entered one by one, none of them is significant.21
The significance of the nuclear family dummy is even larger in a final
regression in Column 8 where we enter together all the regressors which
are significant in the previous specifications, that is, we also control for
political regimes beside economic correlates and time dummies. In this
specification, economic correlates are not significant, the inferior perform-
ance of the Bourbons is confirmed, and a superior performance emerges
for the Habsburgs. The effect of family structure is sizeable, since in this
last regression, provinces with a predominance of nuclear families display
an over 14% higher enrollment ratio. In other words, a one-standard-
deviation increase of the presence of nuclear families is associated with
an increase of 7 percentage points in the female-to-male ratio of the enroll-
ment rate, which is equal to 12.9 percentage points in its sample averages.
Moreover, the partial R-square associated with nuclear families suggests
that residually they explain 5.6% of the variation in the residual female-to-
male enrollment ratio, conditional on the other controls. Similarly, the
presence of partible inheritance implies an almost 17% higher enrollment
ratio, while a one-standard-deviation increase of its presence is associated
with an increase of 5.6 percentage points of the dependent (10.3 percentage
points in its sample averages) and a partial R-squared of 6.1%.22
Similar results (not reported for brevity) obtain if height is replaced by
alternative proxies of prosperity, that is, the 1861–1901 levels of popula-
tion density and estimates of per capita value added due to Istituto
Guglielmo Tagliacarne (2011).
In Table 2, we explore the impact of family structure in further detail. In
Column 1, we add to the basic regression with economic correlates and
time dummies the proportion of women married before age 15 years. In
Column 2, we also add the previous two indicators of family structure. As
already anticipated, age at marriage is an important indicator of the
degree of subordination of women with respect to men and therefore of
gender inequality. We find that early marriage is negatively correlated
with relative female enrollment in both specifications, while the coefficient
21 Same results are obtained if they are entered together (we omit this specification).
22 In a further specification we also control for geography (latitude, longitude, and plain
terrain fraction) which should capture factor endowments, but all dimensions are insig-
nificant and do not affect our results.
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for nuclear family is now larger and more precisely measured. In Column
3, we insert the three family dummies inspired by the Todd (1990) classi-
fication, augmented to account for differential female age at marriage
within nuclear families. The omitted dummy is the one for the egalitarian
nuclear family with late female age at marriage. The coefficients for the
egalitarian nuclear family with early marriage, the communitarian family,
and the incomplete stem family are all significantly negative. However,
when in Column 4 we also add political regimes to reproduce the extended
specification in Table 1, Column 8, the additional explanatory power of
Table 2 The female-to-male enrollment ratio, Italy, 1861–1901: further indica-
tors for family structure
Variable Dependent variable: female-to-male ratio upper primary
enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Height 0.0123 0.0432*** 0.0432*** 0.0221 0.0205
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Industrialization 0.138** 0.0375 0.0142 0.0159 0.00885
(0.0545) (0.0503) (0.0471) (0.0512) (0.0501)
Early marriage 0.0109** 0.0140*** 0.00101
(0.00525) (0.00480) (0.00528)
Nuclear family 0.110** 0.141***
(0.0455) (0.0527)
Partible inheritance 0.163*** 0.167***
(0.0488) (0.0568)
Egal. nucl. family early marriage 0.139*** 0.121
(0.0502) (0.0853)
Incomplete stem family 0.282*** 0.279***
(0.0546) (0.0666)
Communitarian family 0.136*** 0.0932
(0.0459) (0.0727)
Habsburgs 0.102* 0.0759
(0.0572) (0.0619)
Pope 0.0202 0.0322
(0.0698) (0.0850)
Bourbons 0.186*** 0.296***
(0.0649) (0.100)
Observations 207 207 207 207 207
R2 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.58 0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the provincial level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. A constant and time-fixed effects are always included. The omitted
dummies are the egalitarian nuclear family with late marriage in Columns 3 and 5 and the
Savoys for political regimes in Columns 4 and 5.
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marriage age disappears, while the other two dimensions capturing resi-
dential and inheritance patterns are confirmed as significant (to be
recalled, however, is that the variable reflecting age is measured at the
regional rather than provincial level). Similarly, in the extended specifica-
tion in Column 5, only the incomplete stem family—which involves com-
plex residential habits as well as de facto primogeniture—retains an
explanatory power, possibly because of the partial overlap between polit-
ical regimes and prevailing family structures. This exercise confirms that
the two separate dimensions we choose to emphasize from the start not
only display a more robust influence but also allow a more precise assess-
ment of which is the channel through which family structure exerts its
influence.
We also obtain very similar results in Table 3 if we replace the dependent
variable with the enrollment ration at the aggregate primary level. In
Column 1 (the analogue of Column 8 of Table 1), the coefficient of nuclear
family is less significant. The same occurs in Column 2 if compared
with Column 4 of Table 2. In Column 3, if compared with Column 5 of
Table 2, we observe a loss of significance for the coefficient of the egali-
tarian nuclear family with early marriage. These differences are not sur-
prising since the upper level is non-compulsory and therefore more likely
to reflect individual choices, while at the lower level and at the aggregate
we should expect less variability in all the relevant dimensions. Moreover,
a trace of the effect of religion emerges at the lower level (unreported for
brevity), where the presence of the clergy becomes beneficial for rela-
tive female enrollment, even though this result should be taken with cau-
tion since this variable is measured at the regional rather than provincial
level.
In Table 4, we try to evaluate whether the influence of family structure
varies throughout the period under consideration, by adding to the
extended specification of Table 1, Column 8, a set of interactions between
time and each of the two indicators for residential patterns and inheritance
rules. The fact that the interactions are not significant and the positive
coefficient is retained for both indicators confirms that the influence of
our focal variables is stable throughout the historical period under inves-
tigation (for instance, a negative coefficient for the interactions would
instead suggest that the effect is declining through time).
We can therefore conclude that, over the first four decades after unifi-
cation, economic and religious factors are not exerting a significant influ-
ence on the education gender gap, geopolitical factors do so but only
marginally, while nuclear residential patterns and equal inheritance rules
are strongly and persistently associated with a lower gap. Even though we
should be cautious in interpreting our results as causal, the evidence we
present is robust across different specifications.
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5 The Contemporaneous Education Gender Gap
In this section, we investigate the long-term persistence of the effect of
family structure on contemporaneous measures of the education gender
gap. Since gender equality at the primary level is a well-established fact in
post-World War II Italy, we focus on higher educational levels, that is,
secondary and tertiary levels. The position of females at both levels, as of
1971, is far from equal from that of males, especially at the tertiary level.
Table 3 The female-to-male enrollment ratio, Italy, 1861–1901: the aggregate
primary level
Variable Dependent variable: female-to-male enrollment ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Height 0.00643 0.00691 0.00394
(0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0116)
Industrialization 0.00505 0.00285 0.0154
(0.0351) (0.0362) (0.0349)
Nuclear family 0.104** 0.102*
(0.0502) (0.0515)
Partible inheritance 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.0490) (0.0489)
Early marriage 0.00251
(0.00740)
Egal. nucl. family early marriage 0.203**
(0.0796)
Incomplete stem family 0.271***
(0.0610)
Communitarian family 0.0229
(0.0580)
Habsburgs 0.0651 0.0661 0.0218
(0.0435) (0.0432) (0.0443)
Pope 0.0529 0.0534 0.0351
(0.0633) (0.0637) (0.0603)
Bourbons 0.0613 0.0753 0.256***
(0.0454) (0.0488) (0.0875)
Observations 207 207 207
R2 0.38 0.38 0.40
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the provincial level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. A constant and time-fixed effects are always included. The omitted
dummies are the egalitarian nuclear family with late marriage in Column 3 and the Savoys
for political regimes.
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The picture changes sensibly in 2001, with a near-closing of the gap at
both levels, and in fact almost perfect equality at the tertiary level, which
suggests the interplay of different and level-specific factors in explaining
the gap and its evolution. Within this contemporaneous dataset, family
structure is measured again as within the previous historical dataset since,
even though it is true that it has evolved, we aim at capturing its long-term
influence, while avoiding at the same time likely endogeneity problems
which would be associated with updated contemporaneous measures.
Table 4 The female-to-male enrollment ratio, Italy, 1861–1901: dynamics
Variable Dependent variable:
female-to-male upper primary
enrollment rate
(1)
Height 0.0223*
(0.0116)
Industrialization 0.0147
(0.0447)
Nuclear family 0.181**
(0.0812)
Partible inheritance 0.161*
(0.0848)
Habsburgs 0.101**
(0.0501)
Pope 0.0200
(0.0595)
Bourbons 0.179***
(0.0456)
Nuclear*1881 0.0940
(0.0788)
Nuclear*1901 0.0233
(0.0745)
Partible inheritance*1881 0.00795
(0.0855)
Partible inheritance*1901 0.0273
(0.0809)
Observations 207
R2 0.61
Adjusted R2 0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the provincial level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. A constant and time-fixed effects are always included. The omitted
dummy for political regimes is for the Savoys.
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A direct comparison with previous results derived on the basis of the
1861–1901 sample is in order. First of all, flow data for enrollments are
not available at the provincial level for the contemporaneous sample, so
we can only use stock data reflecting the number of females over the
number of males with a specific degree. Moreover, we treat 1971
and 2001 data as cross sections, rather than pooling them as in the
1861–1901 sample.
Keeping in mind the above caveats, in Table 5 we present our results, for
a specification which includes, for each year, the corresponding income
level, the variables reflecting family structure, and dummies for the macro-
regions that reflect the current political geography of Italy (with the North
West, roughly corresponding to the Savoys’ territories, as a reference).
Column 1 shows that partible inheritance is positively associated with
relative female attainment at the secondary level in 1971, while the pres-
ence of nuclear families no longer matters.23 The same conclusion can be
reached for the tertiary level in the same year and again for the secondary
and tertiary in 2001 (Columns 3, 5, and 7).
When we turn to the set of family dummies we find that, relative to the
egalitarian nuclear family with late marriage, the coefficient of the egali-
tarian nuclear with early marriage is significantly negative in three of four
regressions, while that of the communitarian family is positive for the
secondary level in 1971. Taken together, these results are quite different
from those emerging from the historical measures of the gender gap, and
even harder to interpret.
To sum up, over the long run a single dimension of family structure, the
one reflecting equality in inheritance rule, exerts a persistent influence on
the gender gap in education, while residential patterns no longer matter,
suggesting that historical legacies may show different degrees of
persistence.24
6 Conclusion
The first achievement of this article is to adapt existing classifications of
family structure to the specific historical circumstances prevailing in Italy
at least since the 19th century. The second achievement of the article is to
show that family structure exhibits significant variation across Italian
provinces, despite the fact that in cross-sectional studies the country is
often viewed as homogenous in this respect. Finally, the article shows
23 In their analysis of contemporaneous welfare systems Galasso and Profeta (2013) also
find an impact of partible inheritance but not of residential habits.
24 Similar results are obtained when data for 1971 and 2001 are pooled.
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that family structure affects the gender gap in education in a lasting fash-
ion, even after controlling for a rich set of correlates reflecting economic
performances, the political geography of the country prior to unification,
and the influence of the Catholic Church. However, the influence of family
structure varies if we compare our historical (1861–1901) sample with the
contemporaneous (1971–2001) one. While over the historical sample both
nuclear residential patterns and equal inheritance rules are strongly asso-
ciated with more gender equality in education, over the contemporaneous
sample only the latter still exert a persistent influence.
Over a century and a half after the unification of Italy in 1861, the
education gender gap has been gradually closing, and even reversing in
recent years, following a pattern which is common to most developed
countries. As women’s lives have been transformed thanks to the improve-
ment of their educational attainment together with their economic and
social position, the structure of the family inherited from history has
also been transformed, with a rapid decline of marriage and a drastic
reduction of fertility. To understand how family structure and the
gender gap are jointly evolving within a dynamic theoretical model is
the next challenge for future research.
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APPENDIX
This appendix describes the data underlying our study in more detail. The
dataset contains information from 69 Italian provinces at 1871 bound-
aries. We collect province-level data at three points in time (1861, 1881,
1901) whenever available, spanning the first 40 years after Italian unifica-
tion. For the post-World War II period we collect data for 1971 and 2001.
Table A1 contains variable definitions and sources. Methodological notes
on the construction of the dataset follow next. Table A2 presents summary
statistics.
Methodological Notes
Historical education data:We collect data for 1861, 1881, and 1901. Due to
historical circumstances, we encountered a few problems because of lack
of data in particular referring to the first wave. This arises from the fact
that the Italian unification process was a gradual process, and therefore
official statistical annuals could not take into account those provinces
which entered the Italian Kingdom only in subsequent years. As a
result, data on gross enrollments (that is, number of pupils of any age
who are enrolled in primary schools as a percentage of the total official
school-age children) are constructed from various sources and mainly
from Statistica del Regno d’Italia, Istruzione pubblica e privata, a statis-
tical series compiled and published by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Industry and Commerce (MAIC) from 1865 to 1906, and from Vigo
(1971). For most provinces, we impute to 1861 enrollment data referring
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Construction Main source
Primary enrollment rate Pupils enrolled in primary school/
population of primary school age
(6–12) *100
MAIC (various years)
Lower primary enrollment
rate
Pupils enrolled in lower primary
school/ population of primary
school age (6–12) *100
MAIC (various years)
Upper primary enrollment
rate
Pupils enrolled in upper primary
school/ population of primary
school age (6–12) *100
MAIC (various years)
Male primary enrollment rate Male pupils enrolled in primary
school/ male population of pri-
mary school age (6–12) *100
MAIC (various years)
Female primary enrollment
rate
Female pupils enrolled in primary
school/ female population of pri-
mary school age (6–12) *100
MAIC (various years)
Female to male primary en-
rollment ratio
[Female pupils enrolled in primary
school/ female population of pri-
mary school age (6–12)]/ [male
pupils enrolled in primary school/
male population of primary
school age (6–12)]¼ female pupils
enrolled in primary school/ male
pupils enrolled in primary school
* masculinity of primary school
age (6–12) population
MAIC (various years)
Female to male upper pri-
mary enrollment ratio
Female pupils enrolled in upper pri-
mary school/ male pupils enrolled
in upper primary school * mas-
culinity of primary school age (6–
12) population
MAIC (various years)
Female to male lower pri-
mary enrollment ratio
Female pupils enrolled in lower pri-
mary school/ male pupils enrolled
in lower primary school * mascu-
linity of primary school age (6–12)
population
MAIC (various years)
Female to male secondary
attainment ratio 1971
Females with at least a high school
diploma/ males with at least a
high-school diploma. Year 1971.
ISTAT (2009)
Female to male tertiary at-
tainment ratio 1971
Females with a university degree/
males with a university degree.
Year 1971.
ISTAT (2009)
Female to male secondary
attainment ratio 2001
Females with at least a high school
diploma over female population
over age 19/ males with at least a
high school diploma over male
population over age 19. Year
2001.
ISTAT (2009)
Female to male tertiary at-
tainment ratio 2001
Females with a university degree
over female population over age
19/ males with a university degree
ISTAT (2009)
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Variable Construction Main source
over male population over age 19.
Year 2001.
Masculinity Male population of primary school
age (6–12)/ female population of
primary school age (6–12)
Census (various years)
Latitude Latitude of the main city of the
province in decimal degrees.
Passim
Longitude Longitude of the main city of the
province in decimal degrees.
Passim
Plain terrain Percentage of plain terrain over the
total surface of the province
Passim
Distance from Rome Distance of the main provincial city
or town to Rome, in kilometers
(great-circle distance).
http://distanzechilome-
triche.net
Clergy Number of clergy members/ 100 in-
dividuals in population, in year
1857 (at the regional level)
Amati (1860), Correnti
(1858)
Parish churches Number of parish churches in exist-
ence in the 1840–50s/ provincial
surface in squared kilometers.
Bianchi (1845), Palmieri
(1857)
Catholic teachers Number of Catholic teachers/ total
number of teachers, in year 1862
MAIC (1865, 1874)
Nuclear family Dummy variable: 1 if the nuclear
family type prevails, 0 otherwise
Todd (1990)
Partible inheritance Dummy variable: 1 if the partible
inheritance rule prevails, 0
otherwise
Todd (1990)
Early marriage Women below age 15/ married
women, in 1872–1875 (at the re-
gional level)
Barbagli (1987),
DIRSTAT (1877)
Egalitarian nuclear family
with early marriage
Dummy variable: 1 if the
egalitarian nuclear family type
with early marriage prevails, 0
otherwise
Todd (1990), Del Panta
et al. (1996)
Egalitarian nuclear family
with late marriage
Dummy variable: 1 if the
egalitarian nuclear family type
with late marriage prevails, 0
otherwise
Todd (1990), Del Panta
et al. (1996)
Incomplete stem family Dummy variable: 1 if the incomplete
stem family type prevails, 0
otherwise
Todd (1990), Del Panta
et al. (1996)
Communitarian family Dummy variable: 1 if the communi-
tarian family type prevails, 0
otherwise
Todd (1990), Del Panta
et al. (1996)
Savoys Dummy variable: 1 if the province
was ruled by the Savoy-Carignano
dynasty prior to unification, 0
otherwise
Pe´cout (1999)
Habsburgs Dummy variable: 1 if the province
was ruled by the Habsburg dyn-
asty prior to unification, 0
otherwise
Pe´cout (1999)
(continued)
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to 1862–1863. For provinces belonging to today’s Veneto, data on enroll-
ments for the first wave refer to 1856 and are from Buonazia (1870) and
Vigo (1971) for primary school and Sacchi (1858) for upper primary
school. For Mantua, data refer to 1851 and are from Vigo (1971) for
primary school and from MAIC (1872) for upper primary school. For
Rome (and Comarca), data refer to 1858 and are from Vigo (1971) for
primary school and from MAIC (1872) for upper primary school.
To determine enrollment rates, we consider 6–12 (excluded) years as the
relevant primary school age. In calculating lower and upper primary
enrollment rates, we still employ the population 6–12 (excluded) because
we have no data for the specific grade ages. Therefore, at the lower and
upper level we have an unadjusted measure of enrollment (Benavot and
Riddle 1988) which induces a downward bias in the measure of enrollment
rates.
In some cases, gross enrollment rates are >100%, and this is due to
under aged and/or overaged enrollment with respect to the school age
being considered (and this is even more compelling during a period of
expansion of mass education with a high incidence of late entrance).
However, information on net rates (defined as the ratio between enroll-
ments of age 6–12 years over the population of age 6–12 years) is not
available.
Table A1. Continued
Variable Construction Main source
Pope Dummy variable: 1 if the province
was ruled by the Pope prior to
unification, 0 otherwise
Pe´cout (1999)
Bourbons Dummy variable: 1 if the province
was ruled by the Bourbon dynasty
prior to unification, 0 otherwise
Pe´cout (1999)
Height Average height at age 20 of military
conscripts
A’Hearn et al. (2011)
Population density Total population (in thousands)
living in a province (at 1871
boundaries) in 1861/provincial
surface in squared kilometers
MAIC (1864), Vigo
(1971)
Per capita value added Total gross value added in agricul-
ture, industry, and services over
total population of each province
on the basis of census data
Istituto Guglielmo
Tagliacarne (2011)
Industrialization Provincial index of relative industri-
alization calculated on the basis of
census data as the share of in-
dustrial value added, excluding
construction, over the share of the
male population over age 15
Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea
(2013)
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Family structure: Our first indicator is a dummy variable taking value 1
if the province was dominated by nuclear residential habits, 0 if complex
ones. Our second indicator is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the
province was dominated by equal partition rules of inheritance, 0 if by
unequal ones. Information on both indicators is from Todd (1990). Our
third indicator is the percentage of women married below the age of 15
years in 1872–1875, taken from Barbagli (1987) (the original source is
DIRSTAT 1877). Finally, we adapt the classification proposed by Todd
(1990) to the Italian specific regional differentiation following Hajnal
(1982), Barbagli (1987), and Del Panta et al. (1996) and code provinces
according to a set of four dummies, one for each family type: egalitarian
nuclear with late marriage, incomplete stem, communitarian, and egali-
tarian nuclear family with early marriage.
Contemporaneous education data: We collect data on female and male
secondary and tertiary attainment for 1971 and 2001 from national cen-
suses (ISTAT 2009), and we obtain female-to-male ratios to be employed
as our contemporaneous dependent variables. For 1971, our dependent
variable is not weighted by relative population, whereas for 2001 our
variables are weighted by female and male population aged 19 or more
years.
Religion: We measure the influence of religion through four variables.
Our first measure if the distance from Rome of the main city or town of
each province in kilometers. The source is http://distanzechilometriche.
net. Second, we collect information from Bianchi (1845) about the
number of parish churches in each province in 1843 (the original source
is Calendario Generale pei Regj Stati Sardi) and obtain their density by
dividing it by the provincial surface in squared kilometers. Data on parish
churches belonging to the Pope’s territories are taken from Palmieri (1857)
and refer to 1857. Third, we take the fraction of Catholic teachers over the
total number of teachers in 1862. The main source is MAIC (1865), and
MAIC (1874) for provinces of Veneto, Mantua, and Rome. Fourth, we
measure the number of clergy in 1857 (taken from Amati 1860, and
Correnti 1858) per 100 individuals in the population. This fourth variable
is only available at the regional, rather than provincial, level.
Political regimes: This set of binary dummy variables are intended to
capture the ruling dynasties immediately prior to unification: the Savoy-
Carignano, who ruled in the North Western areas of Italy, that is,
Piedmont, Liguria, and the island of Sardinia; the Habsburgs, who held
direct control over Lombardy-Venetia, mostly in the North East, as part
of the Austrian Empire, as well as indirect control over the Granduchy of
Tuscany (Habsburg-Lorena) and other minor Duchies nearby (the Duchy
of Modena under Este of Austria, the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, and
the Duchy of Massa Carrara under Habsburg-Lorena); the Pope, reigning
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over Rome and the Center South; and the Bourbons, in charge of the
South and the Duchy of Lucca. Even though the latter falls under the
Habsburgs in 1847, we consider it as dominated by the Bourbons through-
out the 1816–1861 period. Information is from Pe´cout (1999).
Height:Data about wealth of ancient Italian provinces are not available.
For this reason, we employ height as a proxy for wealth. In the economic
history literature, it is common to make use of anthropometric measures
because they provide important indirect information on changes in the
well-being of the population. Data on height refer to the mean height of
military conscripts aged 20 years at the provincial level and are taken from
A’Hearn et al. (2011). For an exhaustive presentation of the use of this
kind of anthropometric data as a plausible proxy for well-being and living
standards, see A’Hearn et al. (2011, ch. 2). For a discussion about the
methodological approach employed to estimate average height, see
A’Hearn et al. (2009).
Population density: We collect data about the total population living in
each province in 1861 from the census (MAIC 1864) and, for provinces
belonging to Veneto, Mantua, and Rome, from Vigo (1971). We divide it
by total surface of the province in squared kilometers.
Per capita value added: Data on per capita value added at the provincial
level are taken from the estimates of the Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne
(2011) which has calculated total gross value added in agriculture, indus-
try, and services over total population of each province on the basis of
census data. For a detailed explanation of the employed methodology for
these estimates, see Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne (2011). Data for the
first wave for the provinces belonging to today Veneto, Mantua, and
Rome refer to year 1871.
Industrialization: Data on industrialization at the provincial level are
taken from Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2013, Table 2). The variable is a
provincial index of relative industrialization calculated on the basis of
census data as the share of industrial value added, excluding construction,
over the share of the male population over age 15 years. Ciccarelli and
Fenoaltea (2013) explain that using this age/sex group provides the best
proxy of local GDP because adult males represented the most mobile and
flexible segment of the labor force and also because male labor force
participation rates are uniformly high and not clouded, as female rates
are, by varying local conventions. Data for the first wave refer to 1871.
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